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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as currently proposed by the European Union 
(EU) to the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACPs) will prove extremely costly to 
the ACP economies.  This is because, as documented by the note, ACPs have still high or 
substantial tariffs on imports from the world.  If the EU products enter the ACP markets duty-
free, the EU firms could price their products at a (much) higher price than the world price.  
ACP consumers—households and firms—will be hurt.  ACP governments will lose tariff 
revenues. 
 
That said, there is little doubt that the WTO waiver on the current EU-ACP Agreements will 
expire by December 31, 2007—mostly for political reasons—and that the EU has no intention 
to table a Plan B.  And alternatives, such as the GSP or the EBA, are unattractive for many 
ACPs on a purely economic basis, or from a political point of view.  
 
As a result, the ACPs should take an initiative—a ‘Plan A+’. The note explores what could be 
envisaged in the Doha Round context.  The ACP could offer a better access to their markets to 
the non-EU WTO Members for being allowed by these countries to limit the forthcoming 
preferential liberalization towards the EU.  An attractive, mutually beneficial, Doha-consistent 
ACP offer would consist in the ACPs cutting substantially their bound tariffs, and modestly 
their applied tariffs.  As bound tariff cuts substantially reduce the current huge uncertainty in 
trading with the ACPs, they will generate new trade opportunities, more diversified ACP 
economies, and better regional trade agreements between the ACPs willing to do so.  In short, 
they will deliver a much more progressive and balanced liberalization of the ACP economies 
than the one envisaged by the current EPAs. 
 
Such an offer is attractive to non-EU WTO Members—from China to the US.  These 
countries are unlikely to be pleased by ACP markets being open to EU firms while remaining 
closed to their own firms. 
 
The note also explores ways for the ACP countries to conclude ‘Interim Agreements’ with the 
EU in 2007—without preempting an attractive, Doha-consistent solution by hasty decisions 
taken in the EPA context. 
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Sous leur forme actuelle, les Accords de Partenariat Economiques (APE) proposés aux pays 
d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP) par l’Union Européenne (UE) seront des plus 
coûteux pour les économies ACP.  La raison en est que les pays ACP imposent encore des 
droits de douane élevés ou appréciables sur leurs importations, comme le montre cette note.  
Du coup, si les produits de l’UE entrent sur les marchés ACP sans payer de tels droits de 
douane, les firmes européennes pourront pratiquer sur ces marchés des prix (bien) supérieurs 
aux prix mondiaux.  Les consommateurs des pays ACP—ménages et entreprises—en seront 
gravement affectés, et leurs gouvernements perdront des recettes fiscales. 
 
Reste que la dérogation de l’OMC qui permettait le maintien de préférences unilatérales 
expirera au 31 Décembre 2007, largement pour des raisons politiques, et que l’UE n’a pas 
l’intention de proposer un ‘plan B’.  Quant aux alternatives disponibles, comme le SPG ou 
l’initiative TSA, elles ne sont pas attractives pour nombre de pays ACP, pour des raisons 
économiques ou politiques. 
 
Les pays ACP doivent donc prendre une initiative—un plan ‘A+’.  Cette note explore ce qui 
pourrait être fait dans le cadre de l’agenda de Doha.  Ainsi les pays ACP pourraient-ils offrir 
un meilleur accès à leurs marchés aux Membres hors-UE de l’OMC, en échange d’un accord 
de ces Membres sur une libéralisation limitée des pays ACP vis-à-vis de l’UE.  Une offre 
attractive, mutuellement bénéfique et compatible avec l’agenda de Doha consisterait en une 
réduction appréciable des droits de douane consolidés des pays ACP, et modeste de leurs 
droits de douane appliqués.  Comme les baisses des droits de douane consolidés réduiront 
fortement la grande incertitude actuelle liée aux échanges avec les pays ACP, ils engendreront 
de nouveaux flux commerciaux, une plus grande diversification des économies ACP et de 
meilleurs accords régionaux entre les pays ACP désireux de poursuivre cette voie.  En 
somme, ils engendreront une libéralisation des économies ACP bien plus progressive et 
équilibrée que celle proposée par les APE. 
 
Une telle offre serait aussi attractive pour les Membres hors-UE de l’OMC, de la Chine aux 
Etats-Unis, lesquels n’ont aucun intérêt à voir les marchés ACP s’ouvrir totalement aux 
entreprises européennes tout en restant largement fermés aux leurs. 
 
Cette note examine enfin des pistes permettant aux pays ACP de conclure des ‘Accords 
intérimaires’ avec l’UE en 2007, sans pour autant compromettre une solution attractive dans 
le cadre des négociations de Doha par de décisions hâtives dans le cadre des APE. 
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Introduction 
 
Almost eighty African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACPs) are at the crossroads.  On the 
one hand, their current tariff structures will make the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) as currently proposed by the European Union (EU) extremely costly to their own 
economies, for reasons explained in the first section.  On the other hand, the WTO waiver on 
the Cotonou Agreements will expire by December 31, 2007, mostly for political reasons, and 
the EU clearly has no intention to table a Plan B.1
 
There is thus a need for the ACPs to take an initiative—to design their own “Plan A+”—for 
reducing the costs that the EPAs, as currently conceived, will impose on their economies.  
Some of the ACPs might simply decide to turn back to existing schemes—the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP), or, in the case of the Least Developed Countries among the 
ACPs, Everything but Arms (EBA).  Or they might want to use the forthcoming “Duty free-
Quota free” (DFQF) initiative adopted at the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  But, how could the ACPs that are not eligible for these schemes, or that 
would not find them attractive, limit the costs generated by the EPAs?  This note explores the 
wide range of opportunities offered by the ongoing Doha Round negotiations that the ACPs 
should thoroughly examine.  A companion note [Bouët et al. 2007] provides estimates of the 
benefits flowing from these opportunities. 
 
The need for a Plan A+ 
 
Why will the EPAs be costly to the ACPs?  The main reasons are captured by the following 
example (for recent and more detailed analyses, see Delpeuch [2007] or Delpeuch and Harb 
                                                 
1 This note does not question the political or legal justification for EPAs.  Rather, it takes them for granted and 
tries to offer solutions as beneficial to ACP countries as possible.  Similarly, the note takes for granted the 
absence of alternatives offered by the Commission, and it does not address the question of the appropriate EU 
reaction. 
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[2007]).  Nigeria’s average bound2 tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of the world are 150 percent in 
agriculture (farm and food products) and 66 percent manufacturing (NAMA) as shown in 
Annex Table A.  If the EU products enter the Nigerian markets duty-free, the EU firms could 
price their products at a (much) higher price than the world price—up to 1.5 and 0.6 times 
more in agriculture and in NAMA, respectively.  The EU firms would need to charge such 
high prices when they are inefficient, compared to the exporters from non-EU countries.  In 
short, the preferences granted by the ACPs in the EPAs are equivalent to ACPs subsidies to 
inefficient EU firms.  But, the EU firms could also charge such high prices when they are 
efficient, simply to grab the rents generated by the high tariffs imposed by the ACPs on 
imports from non-EU sources.  Of course in such circumstances, Nigerian consumers—and 
that includes Nigerian firms (it is often forgotten that firms are large consumers)—will hardly 
benefit from any liberalization gains, while the Nigerian government will lose tariff revenues. 
 
Table 1. ACPs current bound and applied tariffs:  an overview
Overall
binding
average maximum average maximum average maximum average maximum  coverage
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of countries with available data 55 11 62 11 55 11 62 11 53
Average tariff or binding coverage 78,1 85,9 17,1 48,4 46,2 75,9 12,0 40,0 64,3
Number of countries with:
bound tariff higher than 30% 48 9 -- -- 37 8 -- -- 37
bound tariff higher than 50% 37 9 -- -- 23 8 -- -- 30
bound tariff higher than 70% 33 7 -- -- 12 6 -- -- 28
applied tariff higher than 15% -- -- 33 11 -- -- 15 11 --
applied tariff higher than 20% -- -- 18 8 -- -- 3 9 --
applied tariff higher than 30% -- -- 2 4 -- -- 1 4 --
Sources:  WTO Member Information (www.wto.org).   WTO, UNCTAD and ITC, “World Tariff Profiles” (2007) when data not available in Member Infor-
mation files. Bound tariffs are not dated. Applied tariffs are 2001 data (if 2001 data are not available earlier data have been used). In order to be com-
parable to bound tariffs, applied tariffs are in HS1996 (not HS 2002).
bound tariffs applied tariffs
Agriculture (farm and food)
bound tariffs applied tariffs
Manufacturing (NAMA)
 
 
It could be said that this example provides too dark a picture of the situation because 
effectively applied tariffs may be lower than bound tariffs.  Table 1 suggests that this caveat 
should be treated with great caution.  First, half of the ACPs have average applied tariffs 
higher than 15 percent in agriculture and one fourth have average tariffs higher than 15 
percent in manufacturing—tariffs above 15 percent already constitute serious barriers to trade.  
Second, the ‘peak’ (highest) applied tariffs are very high—almost 50 percent on average for 
all the ACPs in agriculture, and 40 percent in manufacturing.  These peak tariffs are the most 
important ones from an economic perspective because they are concentrated on products 
domestically produced, and because, as shown by economic analysis, they are the source of 
the largest welfare costs for the country imposing them.  Last but not least, many ACPs tariffs 
                                                 
2 Once a tariff rate is bound, it cannot be raised without compensating the affected trading partners or allowing 
those partners to retaliate. 
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are still not bound.  As a result, they can be increased without restraint, hence represent huge 
risks for foreign traders.  For instance, half of the African ACPs have bound less than a third 
of their tariff lines.  Indeed, the increase of imports from the EU following the implementation 
of the EPAs is likely to induce ACPs governments to raise their unbound tariffs on non-EU 
imports.  This economically unsound, but politically driven reaction from the ACPs should be 
expected if the estimates provided by Bouët et al. [2007] are verified. 
 
The opportunities offered by the Doha Round 
 
As the WTO waiver on the Cotonou Agreements expires by December 31, 2007, and as the 
EU has shown no intention to table a Plan B, some ACPs might decide to turn back to 
existing schemes—the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), or, in the case of the Least 
Developed Countries among the ACPs, Everything but Arms (EBA).  However, the estimated 
impact of such decisions provided by the companion note [Bouët et al. 2007] strongly suggest 
that such alternatives are unattractive, either on a purely economic basis (the GSP) or from a 
political point of view (the EBA option is fundamentally an unilateral, hence reversible, EU 
decision)3. 
 
Alternatively, the eligible ACPs might want to use the “Duty free-Quota free” (DFQF) option 
adopted at the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Such 
an option has the advantages to be based on a robust multilateral commitment from the 
importing countries, and to open to the eligible ACPs the markets of the advanced and willing 
emerging economies (not only the EU markets).  But, as of mid-November 2007, this option 
is not yet definitively adopted, and it is based on a 97 percent (not 100 percent) share of 
imports from the eligible countries—a provision that could seriously restrict its economic 
impact on the eligible countries. 
 
As a result, almost all the ACPs have different, but equally strong, incentives to look for an 
initiative of their own in the WTO that would reduce, as much as possible, the costs of the 
preferences that the ACPs should give to the EU under the EPAs. 
 
                                                 
3 Moreover, the rules of origin used under the EBA make EBA preferences very difficult to use. For more details 
on the rules of origin problems (and a comparison with the rules of origin used under AGOA), see Collier and 
Venables (forthcoming). 
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In short, such an ACP initiative would look like the following:  the ACPs would offer better 
market access to non-EU WTO Members for being allowed by these countries to limit the 
forthcoming preferential liberalization towards the EU—in short, for ‘rebalancing their EU-
non EU tariffs’.  It is beyond the scope of this note to specify by how much the ACPs could 
be allowed to limit their forthcoming preferential liberalization towards the EU.  The 
magnitude of such a limit could only be settled by negotiations.  It could range from no 
forthcoming preferential liberalization (in this case, the ACPs would have obtained a new 
‘full waiver’ by offering some opening of their markets to non-EU countries) to a substantial 
preferential liberalization (in such a case, the ACPs would have obtained a ‘partial waiver’). 
 
Rather, this note explores the critical first step of the process—the ACP initiative – both the 
substance of the initiative as well as its benefits for ACP countries. 
 
It is often said that the non-EU WTO Members would not entertain such an ACP initiative 
because it would infringe the WTO disciplines on preferential trade agreements (GATT 
Article XXIV).4  This is far from certain.  The non-EU industrial countries or the emerging 
economies will not like to see ACP markets being open only to EU firms while remaining 
closed to their own firms—especially since ACP tariffs are so high and/or uncertain 
(unbound).  As a result, many non-EU countries may be open to reviewing EU-ACP trade 
relations with some sympathy for the ACPs, all the more if the ACPs were to offer them some 
market opening of their own.  This open mind from the non-EU WTO Members is all the 
more plausible if, as suggested by the companion note [Bouët et al. 2007], the trade diversion 
away from the imports from non-EU countries to imports from the EU is large. 
 
Paradoxically, the only WTO Member that has no trade-related interest in reviewing the EPAs 
is the European Union itself.  This is because the EPAs combined with the current ACPs 
tariffs will undoubtedly make life much more difficult for U.S, Chinese, etc., exporters to the 
ACPs, and much easier for the EU firms.  However, as stressed in the conclusion, the EU has 
also development-related interests in reviewing the EPAs.  If the currently proposed EPAs 
would benefit some European exporters, the EU clearly has a long-term stake in the 
development of the ACPs. 
                                                 
4 It should be stressed that the currently proposed EPAs have not been presented to other WTO members, hence 
might be challenged by some of them.  Moreover, the non-ACP developing countries negotiating preferential 
agreements with the EU have an interest in ‘better’ EPAs in order to avoid any negative precedents that could 
impact their own bilateral negotiations with the EU. 
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 Step 1:  Sketching the ACP initiative 
 
In such a context, what could the ACPs present in the WTO in order to get a green light for 
limiting as much as possible their need to reciprocate against EU preferences?  For simplicity 
sake, what follows focuses on the NAMA sector.  This sector is easier to examine because the 
text tabled by the Chair for the Doha Round is relatively simple (the Agriculture Chair text 
has had to take into account many specific issues).  But, a similar exercise could be done for 
agriculture. 
 
Column 1 of Table 2 gives the status that 65 ACPs have in the Doha NAMA negotiations.  
(The other ACPs are only observers to the WTO, a status that will not prevent them from 
being part of an agreement.)  As shown in Annex Table B, each EPA region includes ACPs 
enjoying between with two and four different types of status at the Doha Round, further 
complicating the issues (although this additional complexity seems manageable).  The six 
different types of WTO status are: 
 the developing countries with a ‘non-low’ binding coverage (DC1 in Table 2); 
 the developing countries with a ‘low’ binding coverage defined as less than 35 percent 
(DC2 in Table 2); 
 the least-developed economies (LDC in Table 2); 
 three types of small and vulnerable economies (SVE1, SVE2 and SVE3 in Table 2); 
Column 3 provides the binding commitments put forward in the NAMA Chair text for each of 
these six status groups.  Column 4 gives the tariff-cut formula when available. 
 
Table 2. The ACPs between the EPAs and the Doha Round:  the basic configurations in the NAMA case
Doha Number EPA Plan A+
status of Binding commitments Tariff cuts (rebalancing EPAs with the Doha Round)
ACPs rules
1 2 3 4 5
DC-1 [a] 5 binding 90% to 100% (depends from the exception option) Swiss 19-23 binding 100%, with the exception option under para. 7b
DC-2 [b] 7 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 28.5% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 27%
LDC 38 substantial increase in tariff bindings none binding 80% at an average level not exceeding 28.5%
SVE-1 [c] 12 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 22% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 21%
SVE-2 [d] 2 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 18% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 17%
SVE-3 [e] 1 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 14% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 13%
Source: The Chair text in the Doha NAMA negotiations.
Notes: [a]  Developing countries with 'non-low' binding coverage
[b]  Developing countries with low binding coverage (lower than 35 percent).
[c]  Small and vulnerable economies with a bound tariff average (in NAMA) at or above 50 percent.
[d]  Small and vulnerable economies with a bound tariff average (in NAMA) at or above 30 percent, but below 30 percent.
[e]  Small and vulnerable economies with a bound tariff average (in NAMA) below 30 percent.
Commitments tabled by the NAMA Chair in the Doha Round
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Discussions to be held in early 2008 should aim at precise definition and negotiation of the 
ACPs initiative.  Column 5 of Table 2 simply aims to give a sense of what, concretely, might 
be envisaged.  Before examining Column 5 in detail, it is crucial to stress that concessions 
made in the WTO are expressed in bound tariffs—a useful degree of flexibility, compared to 
concessions made in the EPAs that are defined in applied tariffs. 
 
For the DC1 group, the NAMA text tables a 90 percent binding commitment and the use of a 
Swiss formula for cutting bound tariffs, with a Swiss coefficient ranging from 19 to 23).5  The 
NAMA text also defines three alternative options for making exceptions to the Swiss 
coefficient.  One of these options consists of binding 100 percent of the tariff lines and using a 
Swiss coefficient increased by 3 points (for instance, a coefficient of 26 if the finally agreed 
coefficient is 23).  This option is by far the most economically sound [Messerlin, 2007].  As a 
result, the DC1 group of the ACPs could offer to the WTO Members a 100 percent binding 
commitment with a Swiss coefficient of 26 as the ‘price to be paid’ for lower commitments by 
these ACPs towards the EU under the EPAs.  The focus on the Swiss coefficient element of 
the offer is imposed by the fact that the three DC1-type ACPs for which data are available 
have already a very high binding coverage (96.6 to 100 percent). 
 
For the DC2 group, the NAMA text tables a 90 percent binding commitment, with an average 
level of bound tariffs not exceeding 28.5 percent.  The DC2 group of ACPs could table a 
proposal with the same binding coverage (a real effort for almost all of them), possibly 
combined with a lower average bound level, say 27 percent—both offers being the ‘price to 
be paid’ for lower commitments by these ACPs towards the EU under the EPAs. 
 
For the various SVEs, the NAMA text tables a 90 percent binding commitment, with an 
average level of bound tariffs not exceeding three different thresholds (depending on the type 
of SVEs).  These ACPs could table a proposal with the 90 percent binding target and (since 
such a binding offer would represent a true effort only for two SVE-type ACPs) with an 
average bound tariff that is, approximately, one percentage point lower than the level 
currently scheduled by the NAMA Chair text. 
 
                                                 
5 The Swiss formula is T = [rt/(r+t)] where ‘t’ is the initial tariffs, ‘T’ the post-negotiation tariffs, and ‘r’ the 
reduction coefficient (hereafter the “Swiss coefficient”).  In what follows, the expression “a Swiss19” means a 
Swiss coefficient of 19.  For illustration sake, a tariff of 300 percent would be cut down to 17.9 percent (with a 
Swiss19) to 21.4 percent (with a Swiss23) and 23.9 percent (with a Swiss26). 
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Finally, for the LDCs group, the NAMA text includes a ‘substantial increase’ in tariff 
bindings which is currently undefined.  The LDC group of ACPs could then use the 80 
percent threshold included in the EPAs as defining the coverage of their binding commitment 
in the Doha Round—a true effort for two-thirds of them.  They could also consider the offer 
of an average bound level not exceeding 28.5 percent because it would homogenize the 
various EPAs regions in terms of ‘average’ level of protection, hence enhancing regional 
integration among ACPs. 
 
All these suggestions show a wide range of opportunities for the ACPs in the Doha Round 
which could allow them to get the green light for limiting their future preferential 
liberalization towards the EU. 
 
Step 2:  Calculating the magnitude of the ACP initiative 
 
Table 3 aims to give a concrete sense of the outcome of all these proposals for the ACPs (for 
which the necessary information for assessing these proposals is easily available).6  Column 2 
provides the Swiss coefficients associated to the above proposals.  When ACPs exhibit lower 
applied tariffs than those indicated in the above proposals (such as for Madagascar, Mali or 
Senegal), the Swiss coefficients are those keeping roughly unchanged the average applied 
tariff.  Swiss coefficients are useful for two reasons.  First, they allow direct and easy 
comparisons among the various proposals.  Second, they can serve as the basis for calculating 
the impact of the various deals to be considered by the ACPs, as does the companion note 
[Bouët et al. 2007]. 
 
                                                 
6 Table 3 is based on two assumptions.  First, data on tariffs are expressed in the Harmonized System at 6 digits.  
Negotiators may use more disaggregated tariffs.  However, such a difference has generally no impact on tariff 
averages (of course, it may have on peak tariffs).  Second, when no binding tariff was mentioned in the data, a 30 
percent tariff was added to the existing applied tariff.  That explains the differences between Table 3 and Table B 
in the Annex. 
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Table 3. ACPs, EPAs and the Doha Round:  the NAMA case
Doha Swiss
status coefficient coverage
initial final initial final (final) [b] initial final
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Central Africa
Cameroon DC-2 60 47,9 26,4 17,4 17,4 68,7 30,5 9,0
Gabon DC-1 23+3=26 16,2 9,6 17,3 9,6 55,0 -1,1 0,0
Eastern Southern Africa
Burundi LDC 70 49,0 27,8 21,9 18,6 62,6 27,1 5,9
Madagascar LDC 70 34,3 22,7 5,6 5,6 99,4 28,7 17,1
Rwanda LDC 40 91,8 27,1 17,8 16,7 56,2 74,0 9,3
Kenya DC-2 60 45,1 25,2 14,8 12,9 95,9 30,3 12,2
Wstern Africa
Mali LDC 70 32,3 20,7 10,5 9,0 85,7 21,8 10,1
Senegal LDC 70 30,0 21,0 11,6 11,6 100,0 18,4 9,4
Ivory Coast DC-2 60 33,9 20,4 11,6 10,6 80,4 22,3 8,8
Nigeria DC-2 60 56,9 28,5 25,2 21,3 65,0 31,7 3,3
Carribbean Region
Guyana SVE-1 40 50,7 22,3 9,6 8,8 96,3 41,1 12,7
Trinidad and Tobago SVE-1 40 50,8 21,9 6,6 6,2 94,6 44,2 15,3
Sources:  WTO Member Information (www.wto.org).  WTO, UNCTAD and ITC, “World Tariff Profiles” (2007) when data
was not avaible in Member Information files.  See notes in Table 1.
Notes:  [a] difference between bound and applied tariffs. [b]  percentage of tariff lines with tariff water.
Tariff water [a]
averagebound applied
Average tariffs
 
 
Table 3 shows that the above proposals would deliver three key results.  First, the ACPs 
would substantially cut their bound tariffs—on average, by almost half, as shown by columns 
3 and 4.  Second, the ACPs would modestly cut their applied tariffs (on average by 10-15 
percent, as shown by columns 5 and 6), meaning that the ACPs would avoid significant tariff 
revenue losses.  Last but not least, the ACPs would substantially cut the ‘tariff water’ (that is, 
the difference between the bound and applied tariffs) in their tariff structures, as shown by 
comparing columns 8 and 9.  More precisely, the share of tariff lines for which there is still 
some tariff water (bound tariffs higher than applied tariffs) remains large (80 percent), but the 
remaining tariff water is often lower than 10 percent—when it is higher, it is because the 
ACPs in question have already low applied tariffs (for instance, Madagascar, Mali or Trinidad 
and Tobago). 
 
The positive economic impact of cuts in bound tariffs and in tariff water should be stressed 
because it is generally ignored.  Cuts in ACPs bound tariffs would reduce substantially the 
uncertainty in trade with the ACPs, and they are all the more important for the ACPs because 
the small size of their economies already leads foreign exporters to pass over them in favor of 
other, larger, markets.  The final level of tariff water for the ACPs included in Table 3 would 
be roughly 10 percent—a quite affordable risk for foreign traders, while still offering some 
flexibility to the ACPs governments in case of turbulences.  In other words, substantial cuts in 
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bound tariffs and tariff water represent a true market opening, creating new trade flows and 
opportunities.7
 
The Plan A+ would also offer more opportunities of diversification to the ACP economies, 
enhancing the emergence of industrial sectors, as observed in Kenya and in a few other ACP 
economies.  Last but not least, it would allow the ACPs willing to define ‘external common 
tariffs’ (customs unions) to do so in a WTO-consistent way (contrary to what is happening)—
killing two birds with one stone.  In short, the Plan A+ would generate a more progressive and 
balanced liberalization of the ACP economies than the one envisaged with the current EPAs.   
 
This crucial conclusion deserves a final remark.  It is not yet possible for trade models to 
estimate the impact of decreasing risks in trade due to smaller tariff water.  It is thus important 
to keep in mind that the companion note [Bouët and al. 2007] does not take into account a 
critical aspect of the above proposals—underestimating their positive impact on the ACPs. 
 
The ‘Interim Agreements’:  Playing for time 
 
Tables 2 and 3 suggest quite a broad range of possible, balanced, and mutually profitable 
agreements.  However, doing nothing on the EPA front before December 31, 2007, would 
send the wrong message to the other WTO Members (and to the EU).  As a result, how is it 
possible to combine the sketched ACP initiative with the EPA negotiations? 
 
The ‘Interim Agreements’ on the EPAs between the EU and the ACPs, to be signed within the 
next few weeks, should have two goals.  They should show that the ACPs are willing to move 
forward and take initiatives.  They should not preempt the negotiations between the ACPs and 
the non-EU countries by hasty decisions taken in the EPA context before December 2007.  
What follows explores various possibilities, to be combined or not. 
 
The products with no noticeable domestic production.  These products would probably be 
among the 80 percent of trade that would be liberalized by the ACPs in the EPAs as currently 
conceived, and among those with low or moderate tariff rates (it is beyond the scope of this 
technical note to go into details to define them).  For the many small ACP economies, these 
                                                 
7 Contrary to what is often believed, particularly in the negotiating circles, cuts in applied tariffs are not the only 
ones to create new trade flows. 
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products may represent a substantial proportion of the 80 percent of tariff lines to be 
liberalized. 
 
The ACPs could agree on eliminating the tariffs on such imports from the EU.  But, at the 
same time, and pending the results of the 2008 negotiations in the WTO forum, the ACPs 
could impose a ‘value-added tax’ (VAT) on imports from the EU at the same rate(s) as the 
corresponding tariffs imposed on imports from non-EU sources.  As a result, ACP protection 
would remain non-discriminatory, since the imports from the EU and those from the non-EU 
sources would be taxed at the same rate.  And there would be no infringement of the WTO 
‘national treatment’ (even if, as is likely, the VAT is levied only at the border in ACPs) since 
there is no domestic production that would be exempt from the tax. 
 
The products with non-sensitive domestic production.  These products are likely to constitute 
the rest of the 80 percent threshold imposed by the EPAs (to the extent that the previous 
products do not account for 80 percent, on their own).  The VAT option on imports from the 
EU is excluded since it would infringe the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
Alternative options could be (i) not to include these products in the Interim Agreements, 
hoping for results on the ‘rebalancing’ exercise from the Doha negotiations in early 2008, or 
(ii) to begin to reduce the tariffs on imports from the EU for the products with the lowest 
tariffs on imports from non-EU countries (that is, those with the lowest risk of trade distortion 
between EU and non EU sources of imports), or (iii) to begin a slow and progressive 
elimination of the tariffs on imports from the EU, or (iv) some combination of the previous 
options. 
 
The products with sensitive domestic production.  These products are likely to be concentrated 
in the 20 percent ‘not to be liberalized’ in the current EPA context—once again, conditional 
on an agreement by WTO Members on the European Commission’s proposals for thresholds 
(90 percent for the bilateral trade, and 80 percent for the ACP part of the bilateral trade). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ACPs are the only countries that can resolve, in a beneficial way for their economies, the 
dilemmas posed by the expiration of the Cotonou waiver and the Commission’s proposed 
 12
EPAs.  They could rightly argue that the current insistence of some WTO Members on strict 
respect for GATT Article XXIV (reciprocal trade concessions) has a perverse outcome in this 
particular case.  After all, the ACPs are required to enforce reciprocity, hence grant 
preferences—huge, since the ACPs have high bound tariffs—at precisely the time when the 
EU is de facto reducing the preferences it is granting to them.8  But such an argument would 
have very little weight in the absence of an initiative from the ACPs themselves. 
 
The European Union’s position also deserves a final remark.  In the face of genuine 
alternatives, to insist on the EPAs as currently conceived would be to reveal that the European 
Union is more interested in extracting preferential access from the ACPs—in other words, in 
excluding efficient competitors (including China) from their markets—than in following a 
development-friendly trade policy.  If the EU’s commitment to development is as strong as it 
regularly claims it is, then the EU should be a strong supporter of ‘rebalancing’ the ACPs 
market access commitments via-à-vis the EU, following the ACP initiative in the WTO 
forum. 
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Table A. ACPs current bound and applied tariffs
Regional Doha Overall
Countries groupings status binding
avg max avg max avg max avg max  coverage
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Central Africa
Gabon CEMAC DC-1 59,9 60,0 22,7 30,0 16,2 60,0 17,3 30,0 100,0
Cameroon CEMAC DC-2 80,0 80,0 22,9 30,0 78,7 80,0 17,4 30,0
Congo CEMAC DC-2 30,0 22,6 14,7 17,7 16,1
Central African Rep. CEMAC LDC 30,0 22,1 37,9 17,4 62,5
Chad CEMAC LDC 80,0 22,1 75,0 17,4 13,5
Eq. Guinea CEMAC LDC 22,1 17,4
Sao Tome Principe [obs]
Eastern and Southern Africa
Kenya EAC-COMESA DC-2 96,9 100,0 19,2 40,0 92,3 100,0 14,8 40,0 14,6
Zimbabwe COMESA-SADC DC-2 139,6 10,8 21,0
Burundi COMESA LDC 94,6 100,0 34,8 40,0 35,9 100,0 21,9 40,0 21,8
Congo DR COMESA-SADC LDC 98,2 12,8 95,9 11,9 100,0
Djibouti COMESA LDC 48,4 21,7 39,9 29,1 100,0
Eritrea COMESA LDC 17,3 16,7
Ethiopia COMESA LDC 17,3 16,7
Madagascar COMESA-SADC LDC 30,0 30,0 6,0 20,0 25,7 30,0 5,6 30,0 29,7
Malawi COMESA-SADC LDC 121,3 14,7 42,4 13,3 31,2
Rwanda COMESA LDC 73,7 100,0 14,2 30,0 91,8 100,0 17,8 30,0 100,0
Somalia COMESA LDC
Uganda EAC-COMESA LDC 77,7 19,0 50,6 11,7 15,8
Zambia COMESA-SADC LDC 123,3 18,8 42,2 13,2 16,7
Mauritius COMESA-SADC SVE-3 119,6 7,1 19,1 3,0 17,8
Comoros COMESA [obs] 26,2 13,1
Seychelles COMESA [obs]
Sudan COMESA [obs] 74,3 14,6 91,9 19,4 100,0
South Africa
Botswana SACU-SADC DC-1 38,4 9,3 15,7 7,8 96,6
Swaziland SACU-COMESA-SADC DC-1 40,8 9,3 15,7 7,8 96,6
Namibia SACU-SADC DC-2 40,8 9,2 120,0 11,7 13,4
Angola SADC LDC 52,8 9,6 60,1 6,8 100,0
Lesotho SACU-SADC LDC 200,0 9,0 60,0 7,8 100,0
Mozambique SADC LDC 100,0 16,4 6,6 11,4 13,6
Tanzania EAC-SADC LDC 120,0 19,0 120,0 11,7 13,4
Western Africa
Ivory Coast ECOWAS DC-2 14,9 64,0 14,8 20,0 9,0 25,0 11,6 20,0 33,1
Ghana ECOWAS DC-2 97,1 34,7 14,3
Nigeria ECOWAS DC-2 150,0 150,0 33,6 100,0 66,0 150,0 25,0 100,0 19,2
Benin ECOWAS LDC 61,8 14,3 11,4 11,6 39,3
Burkina Faso ECOWAS LDC 98,1 14,3 13,1 11,6 39,2
Gambia ECOWAS LDC 103,5 56,1 13,7
Guinea ECOWAS LDC 39,7 14,6 10,0 11,5 38,9
Guinea Bissau ECOWAS LDC 40,0 14,3 50,0 11,6 97,8
Liberia ECOWAS LDC
Mali ECOWAS LDC 59,1 75,0 15,5 25,0 15,5 60,0 10,5 25,0 40,6
Niger ECOWAS LDC 83,1 14,3 38,1 11,6 96,5
Senegal ECOWAS LDC 29,8 30,0 14,8 20,0 30,0 30,0 11,6 20,0 100,0
Sierra Leone ECOWAS LDC 40,3 16,4 48,5 13,1 100,0
Togo ECOWAS LDC 80,0 14,3 80,0 11,6 14,0
Mauritania LDC 37,7 12,4 10,5 10,5 39,3
Cape Verde ECOWAS [obs] 11,7 10,2
Carribbean region
Cuba DC2
Haiti LDC 21,3 5,7 18,3 2,4 89,2
Suriname LDC 19,9 17,1
Antigua Barbuda SVE-1 105,0 15,0 51,4 8,9 97,9
Barbados SVE-1 111,2 30,0 72,9 11,0 97,9
Belize SVE-1 101,4 20,7 51,5 9,3 98,0
Dominica SVE-1 112,2 20,4 50,0 8,3 94,8
Grenada SVE-1 101,0 16,9 50,0 9,2 100,0
Guyana SVE-1 99,9 100,0 21,6 100,0 50,7 100,0 9,6 70,0 100,0
Saint Kitts and Nevis SVE-1 108,6 13,3 70,8 8,6 97,9
Saint Lucia SVE-1 114,6 14,8 53,9 8,0 99,6
Saint Vincent Grenadines SVE-1 91,7 16,6 54,5 8,9 99,7
Trinidad and Tobago SVE-1 91,7 156,0 16,6 67,5 50,8 100,0 6,6 45,0 100,0
Dominican Republic SVE-2 39,6 13,1 34,2 7,8 100,0
Jamaica SVE-2 97,1 17,2 42,4 5,8 100,0
Bahamas [obs] 24,1 31,2
Pacific region
Papua New Guinea DC 48,3 16,7 30,1 3,7 100,0
Tonga SVE 25,3 15,8
Fiji SVE-1 48,9 25,7 40,0 7,8 52,3
Solomon Islands SVE-1 76,3 17,5 79,6 14,1 100,0
Samoa [obs]
Vanuatu [obs] 33,2 13,8
Cook Islands
Kiribati 24,9 16,3
Marshall Islands 
Micronesia 4,6 4,5
Nauru
Niue
Palau 2,7 3,0
Timor-Leste
Tuvalu
Source:  WTO member information (www.wto.org) and WTO, UNCTAD and ITC “World Tariff Profiles” (2007) when data was not avaible in member informatio
Notes: Bound tariffs are not dated. Applied tariffs are almost always 2001 data, unless not available and thus earlier data. Indeed, for practical reasons, applied
tariffs were needed in HS1996, and not HS 2002, so as to be comparable to bound tariffs.
avg = average, max = maximum, [obs] = observer status at the WTO.
[a]  Developing countries with 'non-low' binding coverage
[b]  Developing countries with low binding coverage (lower than 35 percent).
[c]  Small and vulnerable economies with a bound tariff average (in NAMA) at or above 50 percent.
[d]  Small and vulnerable economies with a bound tariff average (in NAMA) at or above 30 percent, but below 30 percent.
[e]  Small and vulnerable economies with a bound tariff average (in NAMA) below 30 percent.
bound tariffs applied tariffs
Agriculture (farm and food) Manufacturing (NAMA)
bound tariffs applied tariffs
 
 14
Table B. The ACPs between the EPAs and the Doha Round
Doha EPA Plan A+
Countries status Binding commitments Tariff cuts (rebalancing EPAs with the Doha Round)
rules
1 2 3 4 6
Central Africa
Gabon DC-1 binding 90% to 100% (depends from the exception option) Swiss 19-23 binding 100%, with the exception option under para. 7b
Cameroon DC-2 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 28.5% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 27%
Congo DC-2 same no formula same
Central African Rep. LDC substantial increase in tariff bindings none binding 80% at an average level not exceeding 28.5%
Chad LDC same none same
Eq. Guinea LDC same none same
Sao Tome Principe [obs]
Eastern and Southern Africa
Kenya DC-2 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 28.5% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 27%
Zimbabwe DC-2 same no formula same
Burundi LDC substantial increase in tariff bindings none binding 80% at an average level not exceeding 28.5%
Congo DR LDC same none same
Djibouti LDC same none same
Eritrea LDC same none same
Ethiopia LDC same none same
Madagascar LDC same none same
Malawi LDC same none same
Rwanda LDC same none same
Somalia LDC same none same
Uganda LDC same none same
Zambia LDC same none same
Mauritius SVE-3 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 14% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 13%
Comoros [obs]
Seychelles [obs]
Sudan [obs]
South Africa
Botswana DC-1 binding 90% to 100% (depends from the exception option) Swiss 19-23 binding 100%, with the exception option under para. 7b
Swaziland DC-1 same Swiss 19-23 same
Namibia DC-2 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 28.5% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 27%
Angola LDC substantial increase in tariff bindings none binding 80% at an average level not exceeding 28.5%
Lesotho LDC same none same
Mozambique LDC same none same
Tanzania LDC same none same
Western Africa
Ivory Coast DC-2 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 28.5% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 27%
Ghana DC-2 same no formula same
Nigeria DC-2 same no formula same
Benin LDC substantial increase in tariff bindings none binding 80% at an average level not exceeding 28.5%
Burkina Faso LDC same none same
Gambia LDC same none same
Guinea LDC same none same
Guinea Bissau LDC same none same
Liberia LDC same none same
Mali LDC same none same
Mauritania LDC same none same
Niger LDC same none same
Senegal LDC same none same
Sierra Leone LDC same none same
Togo LDC same none same
Cape Verde [obs]
Carribbean region
Cuba DC2 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 28.5% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 27%
Haiti LDC substantial increase in tariff bindings none binding 80% at an average level not exceeding 28.5%
Suriname LDC same none
Antigua Barbuda SVE-1 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 22% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 21%
Barbados SVE-1 same no formula same
Belize SVE-1 same no formula same
Dominica SVE-1 same no formula same
Grenada SVE-1 same no formula same
Guyana SVE-1 same no formula same
Saint Kitts and Nevis SVE-1 same no formula same
Saint Lucia SVE-1 same no formula same
Saint Vincent GrenadinSVE-1 same no formula same
Trinidad and Tobago SVE-1 same no formula same
Dominican Republic SVE-2 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 18% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 17%
Jamaica SVE-2 same no formula same
Bahamas [obs]
Pacific region
Papua New Guinea DC2 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 28.5% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 27%
Fiji SVE-1 binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 22% no formula binding 90% at an average level not exceeding 21%
Solomon Islands SVE-1 same no formula same
Tonga SVE?
Samoa [obs]
Vanuatu [obs]
Cook Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands 
Micronesia
Nauru
Niue
Palau 
Timor-Leste
Tuvalu
Source: The Chair text in the Doha NAMA negotiations.
Notes: [obs] = observer status.
[a]  Developing countries with 'non-low' binding coverage
[b]  Developing countries with low binding coverage (lower than 35 percent).
[c]  Small and vulnerable economies with a bound tariff average (in NAMA) at or above 50 percent.
[d]  Small and vulnerable economies with a bound tariff average (in NAMA) at or above 30 percent, but below 30 percent.
[e]  Small and vulnerable economies with a bound tariff average (in NAMA) below 30 percent.
Commitments tabled by the NAMA Chair in the Doha Round
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